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Eleventh Annual Education Law Conference

The Equal Access Act: Still Controversial After All These Years
Congress enacted the Equal Access Act! almost twenty years ago in order to
guarantee that student religious clubs would have the right to meet in public high schools
on the same terms as other noncurricular clubs. The statute followed on the heels of the
Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincenr requiring a state university to grant
student religious organizations the same rights of access to use campus facilities as other
recognized student groups. In Widmar, the Supreme Court based its decision on the First
Amendment's public forum doctrine and rejected the University's attempt to rely on the
Establishment Clause to justify its discriminatory treatment of religious organizations.
The Court did not decide, however, whether similar rights of access would be
constitutionally mandated in the context of public secondary schools. 3
Congress, preferring not to wait for the Court to answer this unresolved question, and
in the aftermath of several lower court decisions that rejected access claims by student
religious groups at public high schools,4 enacted the Equal Access Act on August 11,
1984 to mandate access rights at public high schools that receive federal financial
assistance. Under its provisions, equal access obligations are imposed on public high
schools that permit noncurricular student organizations to meet during noninstructional
times and thereby create "limited public forums. ,,5 Despite a narrow Congressional
purpose that focused on an effort to prevent discrimination against student religious
clubs, the statute is broadly worded to prevent discrimination "on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech.,,6 The broad scope of the
Act's protections is necessary to avoid violations of both the free speech guarantee, as
recognized in Widmar, and the Establishment Clause.
' 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2004).
2454 U.S. 263 (1981).
3 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the fact that "[ ujniversity students are, of course, young
adults" and "are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the
University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion." Id. at 274 n.14. The Court did not, however,
address the issue of whether the greater impressionability of younger students would be sufficient to justifY
exclusion of a student Bible club at a public high school.

4 Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1041 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983) (striking down school board policy that provided "The School Board
permits students to gather at the school with supervision either before or after regular school hours on the
same basis as other groups as determined by the school administration to meet for any educational, moral,
religious or ethical purposes so long as attendance at such meetings is voluntary."); Brandon v. Guilderland
Bd. of Ed., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981) (Students for Voluntary
Prayer were denied permission to conduct prayers on school grounds: "The record indicates that school
buses discharge students at the Guilderland High School between 7:20 a.m. and 7:40 a.m., and that the
official school day 'begins' at this point. Any voluntary student prayer meetings conducted after the arrival
of the school buses and before the formal 'homeroom' period at 7:50 a.m., therefore, would occur during
school hours. The prayer meetings would create an improper appearance of official support, and the
prohibition against impermissibly advancing religion would be violated.").

20 U.S.C. §§ 4071 (a) and (b).
6 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (a).

5
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Schools that trigger the statute's provisions by creating a limited public forum are
required to provide "equal access" and "a fair opportunity" to stuClent groups that wish to
meet on school property as well as refrain from discriminating against such groupS.7 The
statute specifies five "fair opportlmity criteria" that operate as a safe harbor for school
officials. Schools are in compliance with the fair opportunity requirement of the statute if
they uniformly require that the meetings of student groups be "voluntary and student
initiated," refrain from sponsoring such meetings, require that employees of the school
may be present, but not participate in meetings of student religious groups, preclude
meetings that materially and substantially disrupt the school's educational activities and
preclude nonschool persomlel from playing a significant role in the group's activities. 8
Since its enactment, the Equal Access Act has produced a steady stream of
controversies. The diverse range of issues that have been raised include whether allowing
clubs to meet during the lilllch hour satisfies the statutory trigger of allowing clubs to
meet during "noninstructional time," whether the statute creates rights in addition to the
right to hold meetings on school premises, such as the right to distribute literature about a
club or pse the school's public address system, what constitutes a nonculTicular student
club, and whether the access rights created under the act also apply to gay and lesbian
student organizations. Many of these disputes are complicated by the fact that the student
group bringing the legal challenge also relies on the First Amendment's free speech
guarantee and the public high school defenqing against the lawsuit asserts an
Establishment Clause justification for its actions.
The Supreme Court has considered issues arising under the Equal Access Act only
once since the emctment of the statute. In 1990, in the case of Board of Education of the
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,9 the Supreme COlUt both interpreted the Act's
provisions and upheld it against a constitutional challenge based on the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. In Mergens, the Westside High School allowed 30
student groups and clubs to meet in the school building after school had ended for the
day. When a group of students asked permission to start a Christian club to pray, read
from and discuss the Bible and have fellowship, school officials rejected their request on
the ground that allowing the club to meet would violate the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the statute, considered the meaning of the term
"nonculTiculum related student group," a telTU left undefined by the Equal Access Act.
Relying on the text and legislative history of the statute, the Court concluded that the
term should be broadly interpreted "to mean any student group that does not directly
relate to the body of courses offered by the school."IO In defining "noncurricuhull
related," the Court first focused on the opposing concept of cUlTiculum-related. It
identified four criteria used to determine if a student group directly relates to the school's
cUlTiculum: (1) "if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be

7Id.
s 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (e).
9496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion).
10

Id. at 239.
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taught, in a regularly offered course;" (2) "if the subject matter of the group concerns the
body of courses as a whole;" (3) "if participation in the group is required for a particular
course; or" (4) "if participation in the group results in academic credit."ll
Supplementing its list of general criteria, the Court also provided examples. The
Court expressed the view that the practices of a student orchestra would be curriculumrelated if participation was required of those enrolled in music classes at the school or if
academic credit was awarded for participation. 12 A French club would be curriculumrelated if the school included a course in French in its curriculum or was planning to offer
the course in the near future. 13

In addition to clubs related to particular curricular offerings, the Court also
recognized that a club might be related to the school's curriculum as a whole. The
example it offered was student government if "it addresses concerns, solicits opinions,
and formulates proposals pertaining to the body of courses offered by the school.,,14
Interestingly, student government organizations were not identified as potentially within
the category of curriculum-related based on the fact that the school curriculum included
the study of government in some of its courses. Indeed, the Court specifically rejected the
school's argument that "stude~t government clubs 'advance the goals of the School's
political science classes by providing an understanding and appreciation of government
processes. ,,,t5

,
The Court also gave examples of noncurriculum related clubs. These included "a
chess club, a stamp collecting club, or a community service c1ub.,,16 While the Court did
not conclude that such clubs could never be considered to be curricular-related, it put the
burden on thb school to demonstrate that such clubs were din,ctly related to the
curriculum. 17 In doing so, it specifically rejected the school's argument that a club should
be considered related to the curriculum if it its subject matter is "remotely related to
abstract educational goals.,,18 According to the Court:

Allowing such a broad interpretation of "curriculum-related" would make
the [Act] meaningless. A school's administration could simply declare that
it maintains a closed forum and choose which student clubs it wanted to
allow by tying the purposes of those clubs to some broadly defined
educational goal. At the same time the administration could arbitrarily
deny access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis
of its speech content. This is exactly the result that Congress sought to
prohibit by enacting the [Act]. A public secondary school cannot simply
Id. at 239-40.
12 I d. at 240.
13 Id.
14 I d.
11

Id. at 244.
16Id. at 240.
17 Id.

15

18

Id. at 244.
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declare that it maintains a closed forum and then discriminate against a
particular student group on the basis of the content of the speech of that
group. 19
The Court also considered and rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the
facial validity of the statute. It found that the purpose of the statute, to eliminate
viewpoint-based discrimination against student groups, was a secular purpose and that the
statute's effect, which was to create an 0ppOliunity for a multiplicity of student groups to
meet at public high schools without significant involvement by school personnel, was
similar to the effect in Widmar v. Vincent and was not constitutionally problematic. 2o
Since Mergens, a wide array of issues have arisen over the scope of the rights created
by the Equal Access Act. Some of the issues are made more difficult to resolve because
ofthe absence of clear directions in the statute. While the statute defines the key statutory
trigger of a "limited open forum," it does so by providing that a limited open forum is
created when a "school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more
noncurriculum related student groups to meet during noninstructional time.,,21
Unfortiinately, it fails to define "non curriculum related" and only defines
"noninstmctional time" as "time set aside by the school before actual classroom
instruction begins or after actual classroom instmction ends. ,,22 Moreover, while the
statute guarantees "equal access," it fails to specify what rights are included within that
statutory term.
This vagueness in the statute's terms has left room for significant disagreements over
the meaning of those terms. In some of those disputes, issues have arisen over whether a
school has or h~s not limited student groups to those that are curricvlum-related.23 In
other disputes, major issues have arisen over whether the time used by clubs to meet is
noninstructional time or not. Some courts have limited noninstmctional time to time
before or after the school day while others have included times such as the lunch hour

19

20

Id. at 244-45 (quoting from Mergens v. Bd.
I d. at 247-53.

21

20 U.S.C. § 4701 (b).

22

20 U.S.C. § 4702 (4).

0/ Educ., 867 F.2d 1076. 1078 (8th Cir.

1989)).

23 Compare East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. a/Educ. a/Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp.
2d 1166 (C.D. Utah 1999) (finding Future Homemakers of America, Future Business Leaders of America
and National Honor Society to be cun-iculum-related) with Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d
1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the Key Club, a student service organization connected with the Kiwanis,
was not curriculum-related).
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when classes are not in session. 24 Issues have even arisen over when the school day
2begins. '
While the focus of the Act is on the opportunity for student groups to use school
facilities for their meetings, cases arising under the Act have also raised substantial issues
over whether it mandates that religious clubs receive other benefits provided to student
clubs such as opportunities to publicize the meetings and activities of a student group and
the availability of various sources of funds made available to student groups. This issue
was first addressed in Mergens. In that case, the Court concluded, without discussion,
that the equal access rights guaranteed by the statute meant that the student Bible club
was entitled to the same opportunities to publicize club activities as other student
groups.26
While most courts have followed the lead of Mergens and granted access on the same
terms as are made available to other student groups,27 the resolution of this issue,
however, is not always without controversy. It is made more complicated by the fact that
the statute contains several provisions that limit the access available to students. One such
provision is the right of the school to act "to maintain order and discipline on school
premises" as well as "to protect the well-being of students and faculty.,,28 Another
limitation is the fact that the statute must be interpreted not to authorize the school "to
expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing the space for studentinitiated meetings. ,,29 Thus access to school fuftds may be beyond the reach of the
24 Compare Pri~ce v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. ct. 62 (2003)
(finding that studentlstaff time is instructional time because student attendance is req\!ired even though no
formal classroom instruction takes place during this time period) with Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trustees of the
San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997) (rmding that lunch hour is noninstructional
time).

25 Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that the school day
does not include either homeroom or an activity period both of which occur prior to the first classroom
period).
26 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247. ("Although the school apparently permits respondents to meet informally
after school, App. 315-316, respondents seek equal access in the form of official recognition by the school.
Official recognition allows student clubs to be part of the student activities program and carries with it
access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual Club Fair. Id. at
434-435. Given that the Act explicitly prohibits denial of 'equal access ... to ... any students who wish to
conduct a meeting within [the school's] limited open forum' on the basis of the religious content of the
speech at such meetings, § 4071(a), we hold that Westside's denial of respondents' request to form a
Christian club denies them 'equal access' under the Act.").
27 See, e.g., Westside High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 118 n.17 (D.
Mass. 2003) ("Additionally, denying the LIFE Club official school recognition would violate the Equal
Access Act if such a designation would allow the Club to be 'part of the student activities program' and to
have access to the school bulletin, school bulletin boards, and the public address system."). But see
Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379, 1383-84 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (students wishing
to distribute a religious newspaper in school hallways were not protected by the Equal Access Act since
their conduct was not a "meeting" under § 4072 (3) ofthe Act).
28

20 U.S.C. § 4071 (t).
29 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (d).
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statute's protections. These limitations arguably compromise the statutory goal of
equality of opportuuity for all student groups.
One recent case in which a claim under the statute was rejected illustrates the
relevance of these limitations on the scope of access rights. In Gernetzke v. Kenosha
Unified School District,30 a student Bible club challenged the principal's censorship of
the Bible club's design for a hall mural. The case was triggered by the fact that the school
had invited all student organizations to submit sketches for a mural to be painted in the
main hallway. The principal approved the club's design, which included a Bible open to a
well known passage from the New Testament, but refused to allow the mural to include a
large cross. The principal had also refused to allow a group of skinheads to paint a mural
containing a swastika and to allow Students Against Drunk Driving to include a reference
to a specific brand of beer in its mural. When the exclusion of the cross was challenged
uuder the Equal Access Act, the court found no discrimination based on the club's views
because the principal's reasons for excluding the cross were his fear of litigation and fear
of conflicts among the members of the student body. 31 In upholding the principal's
decision, the court cited to section 4071(f) of the Equal Access Act which limits the act
so it does not restrict the authority of the school to "maintain order and good discipline on
school premises.,,32 The court found that the principal was not discriminating against
religion, but was banning displays that would lead to litigation or disruption. 33
The Ninth Circuit in Prince v. Jacobi4 also at~mpted to interpret the statute to steer
a course between the two potentially contradictory aspects of the statute. In Prince, the
Bethel School District granted a student Bible club, World Changers, only some of the
rights available to other student clubs. The discriminatory treatment was challenged in a
lawsuit filed by one of the student members of the club based on both the Equal Access
Act and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In considering the challenge, the
Ninth Circuit first addressed the statutory issues. It concluded that uuder the Equal
Access Act the Bible club was entitled to participate in various fund-raising activities,
have a club photograph appear in the yearbook at no cost, post flyers on bulletin boards
and use the school's public address system on the same basis as other clubs?5 However,
relying on the Act's focus on noninstructional time and its fuuding restriction, it denied
the Bible club the right to meet during instructional time36 as well as the right to use
school supplies, audio/visual equipment and school vehicles?7
Prince also presents a good opportunity to review the interaction between the Equal
Access Act and the First Amendment, an issue the Supreme Court refused to address in
274 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2001).
31ld at 466.
30

32

1d at 467.

33

ld at 466.

34

303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Cl. 62 (2003).

35

1d at 1086-87.

36

ld at 1087-89

37

1d. at 1090.
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Mergens. 38 In Prince, having found that the statute precluded granting a variety of
benefits to the Bible club, the court went on to consider whether these restrictions were
consistent with the free speech rights of the members of the Bible club. 39 The court
concluded that the Bible club was entitled to meet in classrooms during instructional
time, receive school supplies, borrow audio/visual equipment and use school vehicles on
the same basis as other student groups under the First Amendment.

Citing Widmar and similar cases, the court found that all of the restrictions imposed
on the Bible club were based on the viewpoint of the club and were unconstitutional
under the free speech clause of the First Amendment. 4o Moreover, according to the Court,
nothing in the Establishment Clause precluded the club from receiving the same benefits
as other student groups.41 Therefore, by combining statutory and constitutional reasoning,
the Ninth Circuit found that the Bible club was entitled to complete parity of treatment
with other student clubs. 42
A dissenting opinion in Prince saw things differently. According to Judge Berzon,
Congress limited the reach of the Equal Access Act in order to avoid any violation of the
Establishment Clause. 43 Thus the limitations on the use of classrooms during instructional
time and the funding restrictions were designed to avoid a clash between the statute and
the Establishment Clause. Analyzing the grant of such benefits under the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause precedents, Judge Berzon dissented from the majority's
view that such benefits were constitutionally required and found them to be barred by the
Establishment Clause. 44 Other courts have expressed similar reservations over whether
the First Amendment grants rights to student religious groups that go beyond the
statutory guan!lltees of the Equal Access Act 45

,

While the primary concern of the sponsors of the Equal Access Act focused on
discrimination against student religious groups, the language of the statute is not limited
to the protection of such groups. The Act protects student groups generally against
discrimination on the basis of the content of their speech. Nevertheless, until recently the
cases that have arisen under the Act have involved access claims by religious groups.
Several recent cases, however, have raised the rights of gay and lesbian student groups
under the Act. The results of this group of cases have been mixed. In one case, a federal
district court, relying on a strained interpretation of the Act, concluded that the high

38

496 U.S. 226, 247.

303 F.3d at 1090.
40 Jd at 1090-92.

39

41

Id at 1092-94.

42 See also Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that
student conduct in distributing a religious newspaper in school hallways was protected by the First
Amendment even though it was not a meeting within the meaning ofthe Equal Access Act).

43

303 F.3d at 1098 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).

44

Ed at 1097.

45 Gernelzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Disl., 274 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Wle shall not conceal
our doubts that the First Amendment has a broader scope than the Equal Access Act.").
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school at issue did not permit noncurriculum related student groups to meet, thereby
denying access to the gay/straight alliance. 46 By contrast, several courts have granted
preliminary injunctions against high schools that refused to allow a gay/straight alliance
club to meet. 47
Over its twenty-year history, the Equal Access Act has continued to spark
controversy. Despite a large mnnber of court decisions that have interpreted the scope of
the statute, those controversies have not yet subsided nor are they likely to for the
foreseeable future. Interpretation of the Equal Access Act is complicated by ambiguities
in the statute's language and the complex relationship that exists between the statute and
the First Amendment's prohibition on religious establishments combined with its
protection for freedom of expression. The delicate constitutional balancing act that the
statute attempts to accomplish complicates the task of statutory interpretation in a way
that courts have still been unable to fully resolve.

,

\

46 East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166
(C.D. Utah 1999).

Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County. Kentucky, 258 F.
Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Colin v. Orange County Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (CD. Cal.
2000).
47
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